by Warner Talso

[Editor’s note: this opinion piece originally appeared in Vol 38 No 1 (Q1 2002) of Journal of System Safety. The text has not been modified except for formatting changes, images, and hyperlinks]

Most of us are aware of the evolutionary, even revolutionary, changes that have been taking place in the system safety discipline. These include both technology and areas of application. It is time to review exactly what defines system safety, or at least what we perceive system safety to be. This is a “what” statement, not a “how” statement, and it should be a vision of what system safety encompasses. It is important because it is the key ingredient of what binds us together. It shapes how we see ourselves and how we describe our profession to others.

Recall our origins in the Air Force aerospace arena. The discipline was, and still is, defined by MIL-STD-882. This document has been consistent in defining system safety as, “The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to achieve acceptable mishap risk within the constraints of operational effectiveness and suitability, time, and cost, throughout all phases of the system life cycle.” [1] This definition has served us well over the years. However, the discipline was driven by the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) mandating the implementation of 882. Our Society coasted along on the coattails of this mandatory requirement, with little effort to preach the gospel of system safety or seek out new applications.

This all changed when the Berlin Wall came down and the DoD was no longer driven by the threat of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Remember the de-emphasis on military standards? All of a sudden we had to become proactive in promoting system safety and saving our Society. We have been successful to varying degrees. As the Society reaches out to new members and new industries, the definition of system safety is the shorthand version of what identifies us. I submit that it needs to be more than the military-oriented definition of 882.

Speaking of the Society, what does the Constitution say about defining system safety? Section 1.3 of the Constitution doesn’t define system safety per se, but says: “The term ‘system’ as used herein shall be considered to include any product, service and/or activity developed, produced and/or managed by a specific person, agency, or organization for a designated purpose.

The term ‘safety’ as used herein shall be considered to include any technical, social, educational, and/or managerial action initiated for the purpose of eliminating or reducing the hazards (i.e., risk of property loss and personal injury) associated with a procedure or system.” Well, there certainly are a lot of words there. It is a little verbose and not as focused as it could be. Note that the environment is not mentioned. In today’s world, should it be?

When Perry D’Antonio was our Society President, he wrote the following definition of system safety for the Society’s strategic plan: “The system safety concept is the application of special technical and managerial skills to the systematic identification and elimination or control of hazards throughout the life-cycle of a system.”

This definition of a system includes not only the product or the process, but also the influences (stresses) that the surrounding environment (including human interactions) may have on the product’s or process’s safety performance. A “system,” therefore, defines the boundaries to which the systematic process of hazard identification and control is applied.

When Dick Stephans and I have presented tutorials on the System Safety Analysis Handbook, [2] we have defined system safety as “the application of system engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to take positive steps to optimize all aspects of safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost.” We have emphasized the system analysis/engineering/management process and the need to be proactive.

One of our chapter members is performing software system safety work on a very large project. The client is so impressed with our chapter member’s grasp of the systems approach that the member has been asked to do other systems management and engineering tasks. This anecdotal evidence supports my contention that the system approach is very important to the system safety discipline, and is an engineering and management skill in its own right. In my observation, we do not put enough emphasis on the systems approach of looking at the impact of hazards (i.e., potential sources of danger) to the entire system.

When Clemens and Simmons wrote the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Instruction Manual for System Safety and Risk Management, [3] they did not specifically define system safety, but they did identify the two primary characteristics as “(1) it is a doctrine of management practice that mandates that hazards be found and risks be controlled; and (2) it is a collection of analytical approaches with which to practice the doctrine” (emphasis in the original). This definition introduces management decision-making. This is very important. As Steve Mattern has pointed out in several articles, the system safety practitioner must show value added to the project. The practitioner must be seen by management as a worthwhile member of the team. Recognition of the value of system safety is accomplished by making a positive contribution to managers and the decision-making DOE process. Should this be part of the definition?

The OSHA regulation on process safety management (PSM) provides “an integrated approach to chemical safety, putting the focus on a comprehensive management program.”[4] I don’t think there is any argument that this PSM regulation is an application of system safety. Again, we have an emphasis on management. By the way, why doesn’t the Society have greater representation in OSHA because of PSM, and in the EPA because of Risk Management Planning (40 CFR Part 68)? Just asking.

The tragic events of September 11 should be ample reason alone to reevaluate our discipline. Was not the safety (and security) of the World Trade Center a systems issue? How could we have been involved in preventing this event (security) or mitigating the damage (safety)?

Sandia National Laboratories does research on critical infrastructures encompassing communications, transportation, banking and finance, and several other complex systems. The term high-consequence surety has been coined to identify the safety, security and reliability controls associated with preventing catastrophic events. One such critical infrastructure is municipal water supplies. These are complex systems involving pumping, treatment and distribution processes using highly computerized control systems, and are considered attractive targets for terrorists. The system safety approach allows one to see the broad hazards and evaluate the acceptability of the controls associated with preventing undesired consequences to these processes. One observation of this work is that safety and security are closely related.

The Department of Energy (DOE) has created the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) [5] process to apply a systems approach to safety. This is part of the “Work Smart” process. [6] ISMS defines a five-function process for incorporating safety into the workplace that is almost identical to the system safety process.

As an aside, DOE never calls this a systems approach, nor does it use the term system safety. DOE is now testing the concept that the ISMS approach can be used for security. The above examples raise an interesting question. Should security be included in the definition of system safety? Is there a System Security Society (SSeS) or a System Surety Society (SSuS) on the horizon? Do we want to lead the way in this area?

In summary, I believe it is time to review the definition of system safety to make it reflect the world of today, and to help us better understand our profession and enlighten our associates and friends. A few ideas:

• The definition should include more than just military systems. Recognition of industrial systems, medical systems, software and more should all fit under the umbrella.
• The proactive, positive nature of system safety should be recognized. There should be more recognition of system engineering and management.
• There should be recognition of management decision-making.
• The environment should be addressed.
• The definition should be included in the Society’s Constitution.

A great deal of information could be included. You will have your own ideas. Decisions have to be made. Perhaps we should also promulgate a set of principles to support the definition.

References:

1. MIL-STD-882D, “Department of Defense Standard Practice for System Safety,” Government Printing Office, February 10, 2000.
2. Stephans, R.A. and Warner W. Talso, Eds. System Safety Analysis Handbook, System Safety Society, Unionville, VA, 1993.
3. Clemens, Pat L. and Rodney K. Simmons, System Safety and Risk Management, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Cincinnati, Ohio, March 1998.
4. 29 CFR 1910.119, Process Safety Management, Government Printing Office, July 1972.
5. DOE G 450.3-3, “Tailoring for Integrated Safety Management Applications,” U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC, February 1997.
6. DOE G 450.3-1, “Documentation for Work Smart Standards Application: Characteristics and Considerations,” U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC, February 1997.

Warner Talso is a former New Mexico Chapter President and SSS Director of Member Services. He was the Treasurer of the New Mexico Chapter. Along with Dick Stephans, he was also co-editor of the System Safety Analysis Handbook, a renowned and landmark system safety publication.

(Photo: Warner Talso, right, receives the ISSS 1994 Educator of the Year Award from Mike Brown, left.)

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By Donald M. Layton

[Editor’s Note: This opinion piece originally appeared in Volume 9 Issue 3 of Hazard Prevention (now Journal of System Safety) in January-February 1973. It is unchanged except for formatting and minor corrections.]

Anyone who has attempted to recruit new members for the System Safety Society has heard the question. “What does the Society do, and what can it do for me? ”

Some of the answers to this multiple-question may be found in an excellent folder which is available from the Society Administrative Office, 6060 Duke Street, Suite 101. Alexandria. VA 22304 [Ed.: see here].

Included in this folder are two items of prime importance to prospective members and to present members as well. These are the listings of the objectives and the activities of the System Safety Society.

OBJECTIVES

1. To advance the state-of-the-art of system safety.

2. To contribute to a meaningful scientific and technological understanding of system safety.

3. To disseminate newly developed knowledge to all interested groups and individuals.

4. To further the development of the professionals engaged in system safety.

5. To improve public understanding of the system safety discipline.

6. To improve the communication of the system safety movement and discipline to all levels of management, engineering, and other professional groups.

Let us consider these objectives and see what is being done, and what could be done to meet them.

The Society was founded in 1962 as a non-profit, professional association and was registered in the State of California as the Aerospace System Safety Society, inasmuch as the formalized principles and the term “system safety” originated in, and was principally applied by, the aerospace industry at that time. The original Society consisted of about thirty members.

With the expansion of the Society’s scope to include all product/system safety activity and personnel in other fields, the label, Aerospace, was dropped from the title in 1966.

Individual and group efforts to achieve the objectives have not been limited to those who wear the “Two Sigma” pin, but many of the members of the System Safety Society have consistently been in the forefront of such activity.

One of the most obvious examples of the improvement of communication and the dissemination of matters of safety interest has been this publication, Hazard Prevention. Begun as a newsletter under the direction of the Society’s Founder, Roger Lockwood, the publication was formalized by its first official Editor, Dr. George A. Peters. When the pressure of his business forced George to relinquish this position Roger once again assumed the leadership until Jim Johncox assumed the Editorship.

The majority of the credit of the current size and format of Hazard Prevention can be given to the last three Presidents of the Society – Jack Parrish, who started the new format; Roy Harris, who started the page growth; and Ed Fosler, who has brought a whole new concept to Associate Editors, increased page count, support through advertising and Corporate Memberships, and increased emphasis on submitted articles.

Discussions had been occurring in the Board of Directors meetings for several years as to the sponsorship of an annual symposium, but with the caution that was derived from the desire to make such a conference a meaningful expression, many delays were incurred. As somewhat of a “trial run.” the Southern California Chapter agreed to sponsor a “mini-symposium” (an idea proposed to the Board of Directors by Willie Hammer of Hughes Aircraft) which proved so successful that they have now completed a second one-day symposium. And now finally, plans are underway for the First Annual International System Safety Symposium to be held in Denver in July 1973 under the Chairmanship of George Cranston.

Now to “old timers” in the Society the above information is well known, but a significant point is centered in these facts. I have mentioned but a few of those active in the Society, but if I were to continue the listing of former Society and Chapter officers, members of the Board of Directors, contributors to Hazard Prevention and participants in the other activities of the System Safety Society, I could. probably identify several dozen SSS members who have been or are now active to some degree.

But several dozen out of a membership that exceeds seven hundred is a rather small percentage!

And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country.

– John F. Kennedy, Jan 20, 1961

So, before someone asks us what the System Safety Society can do for its members, let us ask ourselves, in a paraphrase of the words of the late President John F. Kennedy, “What can I do for the System Safety Society?”

One of the most obvious things that can be done is the recruitment of new members. There are, of course, the lofty reasons for increasing our membership – reasons such as the improvement of our professional knowledge; making what we have to offer available to all in the field, and the bestowing of our prestige gained  from being members of an august society to others, but there are more practical reasons for encouraging a membership growth. These include the benefits of national (and international) recognition that comes from representing a majority of those involved in System Safety, conservation of financial resources in the way of administrative costs (which increase at a much slower rate than the membership they support), and greater return to the members in the form of services such as local and national meetings, publications, speakers, and Society sponsored pressure on standards and member privileges.

Another way in which each member may be of service is in participation in Chapter and National society affairs. I don’t propose that every member immediately run for an office, but support would be welcome at all levels. At the Chapter level, for those of you who are fortunate enough to be near an active group, assisting with the newsletter, aiding in obtaining speakers, contacting potential members, and even such a simple task as being in charge of the name tags for the meetings o ‘collecting the money for dinner would take some of the load off those few who are doing most of the work.

And don’t forget Hazard Prevention. If you don’t have an article that is anxious to be printed, perhaps you have an idea that someone else could expand so that others might have the benefit of these thoughts. One of the few direct benefits that we offer to the members is this publication, and it will only be as good as the members make it.

A most important manner in which you can help the Society and system safety in general is to talk about safety to the non-safety types in your organization. Recently I sat next to a man on an airliner who was in charge of one phase of a company product – a product that was designed, manufactured, and partially maintained by his company. There were eight other men on the same plane who were part of a team that was involved in the setting up of this product for a consumer. Our conversation got around to system safety and this team leader stated that he had never heard of the term and had no idea that his company had such a program in force. I wouldn’t want to embarrass anyone by identifying the organization, but over the past few years we have had National officers from this company! And yet here was a person deeply involved in one of the company’s products who didn’t know of the existence of system safety.

If each of the current members of the System Safety Society did a little more for the Society the answer to the question “What can the Society do for me?“. would become so obvious to potential members that the question might never be raised. What have you done? What have you done lately? 

[Ed. – Current volunteer opportunities are on the society website. Submit your JSS manuscript here.]

Donald M. Layton was the former editor of Hazard Prevention and the 1984 ISSS Educator of the Year. He was a professor at the Naval Post Graduate School. He passed away in 2017 at the age of 94.

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By John Covan

[Editor’s note: This opinion piece originally appeared in Vol 35 Issue 4 of Journal of System Safety in 4Q 1999. It has been reformatted from the original, but the text is otherwise unchanged.]

I‘d like to begin a debate about the role of system safety in business.

I have often heard the complaint that safety (in particular, system safety) is viewed by system developers as a necessary evil – something that must be tacked on after the important decisions are made about system architecture and function. How many of us have heard, when trying to inject system safety into a new project, “Come back later, it’s too early for us to talk to you just now”?

Of course we know that to be maximally effective, system safety must be fully integrated from day one. But if we act as if system safety is at the top of the list and argue for our presence based on our company’s slogan (let’s assume it is “Safety is job one”), we will never achieve this integration.

In my opinion, nobody in upper management of the typical company believes that safety is the top priority. This simply reflects the cold, hard facts of business. In his March 1998 Atlantic Monthly article on the crash of ValuJet Flight 592 into a Florida swamp, William Langewiesche writes, “Safety is never first, and it never will be, but for obvious reasons it is a necessary part of the venture.” What venture? The business venture.

So what if you don’t work in the corporate, for-profit world? Does that mean you, as a government or military employee, are exempt from the “business” mindset? No, not for at least the last decade or two. Let’s face it, all the outfits we work for boil down in the end to a business of some sort, competing to produce goods and services and maintain the status quo. Maybe they don’t have a profit line, but they work pretty hard to grow their budgets.

Business people (including project leaders and upper management) tend to focus on words like functionality, marketability, cost and schedule. And why shouldn’t they? If they don’t tend to these issues, their business —- whether product or service – is at risk of failing from loss of competitiveness or other business deficiencies. But safety is not their long suit, and that does hurt their business.

Now, nearly three-and-a-half years after the crash, the lawsuits are still making the news. It was a high consequence event, especially in the business sense. One would think that the airline industry would have gotten busy and hired a phalanx of system safety experts to improve things. But recent press releases tell of improper hazardous materials shipments (the reason the ValuJet flight went down) continuing to flood the airways.

Consider the demise of the billion dollar offshore oil-drilling platform Piper Alpha by fire and explosion in the North Sea in 1988, with the loss of 167 lives. System safety could undoubtedly have prevented the accident by re-emphasizing safety culture as a necessary part of the profit motive, for example. And system safety could have mitigated the horrible consequences by redesigning the rig’s survival systems when the decision was made to retrofit for gas production. Yet the platform design and its management enjoyed no such benefits, and the system blundered forward to a predictable, catastrophic end. The business impact was a bitter pill to swallow – Occidental Petroleum left the North Sea, never to return.

So what’s wrong with this picture? It’s that missing or inadequate system safety is a business risk – just like any other business risk. Sounds simple, right? I don’t think so. If it were, I wouldn’t be writing this essay. The temptation for upper management to separate safety from other business concerns is strong. As long as this way of thinking persists, system safety will continue to be a day late and a dollar short.

To my way of thinking, the only road to success is convincing the powers responsible for designing, building and running systems to add system safety to their business toolkit. These people must become active partners in the process and understand it to its core. Only then will our tasks be elevated to the importance they deserve.

So what can be done to turn things around? Probably lots of things like educating the business community, CEOs and the like. Perhaps we can start with the SSS. What can we do to attract such an audience? Or, are there other avenues to changing the culture of the business community?

I would like to hear your opinions. I believe the SSS has a golden opportunity to reinvent itself and become inclusive of a broader audience. If we don’t, we will remain a bunch of specialists talking to ourselves.

About the Author

At the time of writing, Dr. John Covan was the Vice President of the New Mexico Chapter of the International System Safety Society and was a senior member of the technical staff with Sandia National Laboratory.

by Donald M. Layton

[Editor’s note: This editorial originally appeared in Vol 6 Issue 5 of Hazard Prevention (now Journal of System Safety) in June-July 1970. It has been reformatted from the original, but the text is otherwise unchanged.]

A quick perusal of a listing of professional engineering societies is enough to make one wonder if all of this is really necessary. Is a professional society really a necessary adjunct to one’s profession, or are such groups formed just to foster the whims of a small, elite group of people? Without pausing to assess the merits of any of the hundreds of other societies, let us take inventory of what SSS is, what it is doing, and what it may do in an effort to ascertain whether we really need the Systems Safety Society.

The concept of safety in industrial activity has been with us longer than it has been officially recognized. Some safety practices were implicitly recognized long before these practices were tagged with a formal title of safety. Industrial safety seems to have taken the forefront in the attempt to identify and eliminate hazards in production procedures. In general, however, these groups were concerned with the safety of preparation (manufacturing) and not in the safety of the ultimate consumer. But with the advent of forms of built-in consumer safety-under such appellations as product insurance, product assurance and even quality control, efforts began to be expended to eliminate or reduce the potential hazards before the product reached the hands of the consumer.

A System Safety Society charter and pin does not make a professional organization. If we are to achieve recognition as an association of the highest standards, we must work hard at it.

Many people in the safety field recognized at this time that there existed a need for an interchange of information in regard to methods and procedures, not only to improve the product, but also to lessen the load on those who were charged with safety and safety improvements.

In the late 1950’s, the concept of safety of the system vice safety of the bits and pieces began to be recognized, not only at the safety level, but even at higher levels of management. As the years progressed, the manufacturers found that specific safety efforts were no longer on a ‘nice to have’ basis, but now began to be included in work statements via the route of the Mil Spec and later, the Mil Std. At long last, there came to be a realization among other than the safety types that a concentrated safety effort across the board was not only a worthwhile task, but also that it might be funded by other than overhead.

The possibility of including System Safety as a discipline to stand alongside Reliability, Maintainability brought not only recognition to the safety engineer, but it also enlarged the scope and depth of his endeavors. It was about this time that a group of these dedicated safety engineers felt that the time was propitious to establish a formal association of those who were working in this field.

The mere establishment of such a society, however, is not an indication of its merits, but the post-formation activities of the System Safety Society have already demonstrated that this is going to be much more than a membership club. Interest in the promotion of the basic aims of the society has resulted in the chartering of local Chapters, all of which have active programs. This, in itself, is almost the ultimate in accomplishment for a national association, since the real strength of the SSS, or any other professional group, lies not in a strong upper hierarchy (although that is of prime necessity) but in activities on the personal level.

All of the functions cannot be focussed at the Chapter level, for by so doing, the activities will overlook and slight a great many of those who need to be reached. One danger that is always present even with an optimum local/national mix of activities is that the program and projects tend to become incestuous in nature. Although there exists a need to ‘spread the word’ among safety engineers, there is perhaps as great a requirement to indoctrinate those in other disciplines as to the necessities, peculiarities and advantages of a strong system safety engineering program.

An excellent example of the latter activity may be found in the participation of the System Safety Society in the annual Reliability and Maintainability Conference. (See Safety Has Its Day, this issue). Even before the establishment of SSS, there was a concentrated safety flavor to the meetings of this conference. Individuals (many of whom were among the founders of the Society) organized sessions and presented papers as early as 1965. This forum not only permitted those of like interests to talk among themselves, but also offered the opportunity for those of the related disciplines to gain a little insight as to what was going on in safety.

Now as to the future. Two great needs must be fulfilled if we are to improve the stature of the SSS to that of a truly ‘professional’ professional society. First, as a continuation and improvement of the effort that has already been seen at the R & M Conference, a concerted program to include safety-oriented papers in national meetings must be established and maintained. A quick look at but one segment, the AIAA, shows a minimum of seven meetings in the next year that could fit one or more safety papers into their general theme.

The second need is possibly even more urgent if we are to speak as the voice of System Safety. The origin of this association was in the aerospace field for it was here that the concepts leading to the Mil Spec were founded. But in our early growth there has been some evidence of the neglect of some of the other aspects of the safety community. This neglect is probably more due to external circumstances than to any internal workings, but now is the time to invite, persuade and even cajol such activities as nuclear, highway, rail, consumer product and industrial safety to join with us in furthering the cause. Of course, there are those in SSS who are representative of these fields, but we have only begun to tap this vital resource. There is an ancient axiom that states that we must profit from the mistakes of others since we do not have time to make all of the mistakes ourselves. It should be obvious that there have been lessons learned in other fields that may have direct or indirect application to some of the problems that we are facing.

How can we achieve this broadening of the base of the System Safety Society? One way is for local Chapter programs to include those from allied safety fields either as speakers or just as guests. Equally opportune is the offering of our services to talk about our problems (and solutions).

If you know of some group, such as traffic safety for example, that has some form of get-together, why not offer yourself for a visit to their meeting? The number of these groups and individuals in these fields (many who have never joined any society because no one ever asked them) is legion. Did you know that there is a society with a safety section that is called Women’s National Aeronautical Association of the United States, Inc.? They are a great bunch, but I wouldn’t want my sister to marry one of them.

A System Safety Society charter and pin does not make a professional organization. If we are to achieve recognition as an association of the highest standards, we must work hard at it.

[Editor Note: Donald M. Layton was the former editor of Hazard Prevention and the 1984 ISSS Educator of the Year. He was a professor at the Naval Post Graduate School. He passed away in 2017 at the age of 94. Read his professional biography.]

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by Brian M. Moriarty

[Editor Note (2022): This President’s message originally appeared in Vol 15 Issue 6 of Hazard Prevention (now Journal of System Safety) in Sept-Oct 1979. It has been reformatted from the original, but the text is otherwise unchanged.]

EDITORS NOTE (1979): The following presentation was made by our Society President Brian Moriarty on July 10, 1979, at the opening of the Fourth International System Safety Conference in San Francisco. It is reproduced for the benefit of the many members who were unable to attend the conference so each one may comment on the society’s objectives as Brian outlines them.

We have come to San Francisco to exercise our hazard control techniques. In many ways it is rather opportune that the entry of Skylab is not mapped over this area and I must compliment the committee on good planning for this time and date and the invitation sent to the many of us from the Eastern section of the United States who can join you here. With the last trajectory path of Skylab that I remember the termination path was going to cross Washington D.C. Therefore, I know that judicious use of the hazard control techniques has been exercised in seeking the Western region for this conference. However, I still remember the warnings given by NASA that we should keep away from the top floors of buildings to assure that we have no penetrations through the roof.

Our challenge […] should focus on developing system safety efforts that are “more effective, meaningful and comprehensive”.

I particularly remember our System Safety Conference in 1973 at Denver when Guy Cohen was able to give us first hand information regarding Skylab and its problem with the solar panel deployment. In many ways it is rather ominous that this time this satellite is with us again now in another phase of its life cycle, that being termination rather than initiation. This truly represents a life history of a particular project that many of you have personally followed with intense interest as System Safety Professionals.

The year of 1979 has been a year of action for Safety…perhaps in a manner that many of us did not expect nor anticipate related to accidents. The BART tunnel fire, Three Mile Island incident, DC10 accident and subsequent grounding, Nuclear waste disposal, asbestos disclosure, railroad derailments and collisions, pollution of chemicals in waste areas, etc. We learn from accidents in an even more penetrating manner that we, perhaps, exert in the initial design and development phase. However, it is quite obvious to us that the avoidance of accidents must come from the realization that a more thorough and complete examination of products and systems must be performed “up-front” in the concept, design and development and production and testing areas. A frontal attack to gain top management visibility and commitment on this need for examination is a clear and distinct mandate. The “cause and effect” relationship between the potential of hazards must be thoroughly disclosed and the alternatives for control must be acknowledged for action.

Yet I think you would all concur that this must not be “Cosmetic” as Chuck Childs very strongly brings out in his recent article in Hazard Prevention. If we, as System Safety Professionals, are going to be able to contribute to the hazard identification and control it means incisive questioning about the operation of a system and the use of a product…to the extent that the System Safety Professional becomes the “System Integrator“: System Safety in many ways grew out of the System Engineering discipline where it was totally necessary to know all facets of the design, production, operation and maintenance requirements with the perceiving examination of action to take in emergency when failures occur in the product or the system. We understand System Safety as a total examination in all aspects of the Life Cycle of the product or system to distinguish the eminent hazards, to identify the controls that can be applied, and to evaluate the risks associated with the types of controls that are available.

The very reknown Physicist Max Born commented on the nature of the Universe in pointing out that most things can be ruled into the “possible occurrences” and the “impossible occurrences.” However, he went one step further in recognizing that the controls to these situations occurring can be “sensibility” is a part of the examination of controls, so that “insensible” things do not become a reality. The direction of the System Safety professional is in acknowledging a practical, realistic basis of consideration of his findings that is attuned to “‘potential of the hazard” occurrence and “reasonableness of acceptability?”

There has been tremendous advancements in Science and Technology in the last years to increase the complexity of the hardware and controls of products and systems. This, in turn, has made it more difficult to perform System Safety Analysis. The incorporation of software and hardware has created the requirement to carefully understand the close relationship that these elements have. The rapid advancement of automated missile systems, controlled by a myriad of software programs has necessitated copious detailed analysis of the software and its impact in leading to undesired events for the missile. These same architectural happenings are occurring in rail transit, energy systems, space technology, automobiles, and manufacturing and construction areas, to name a few. A challenge that exists is for System Safety to continue to develop techniques and methods to assure the better understanding of software and hardware hazards and provide the total umbrella of knowledge of hazard detection before the equipments become operational.

The Three Mile Island incident has surfaced a unique problem in the ability to follow through with System Safety Analysis and corrective action methods from design to procurement, to installation, to operation and full turnover to responsive ownership.

The challenge that exists, in this instance, is to provide the safety management methods to assure that a total disclosure of hazards is done not only by the designer, but also by the installer, the user and the maintainer. Where needed proper regulation oversight may also be required to follow a consistent thread of safety in design to safety in practice. Again the life cycle aspects of System Safety bring us to the realization that performing the System Safety task in one element is NOT ENOUGH.

It must be accomplished across the board and traceability provided for all parties in order to not neglect responsive hazard control action.  In setting a course for the following year I have some basic goals that I would like to state to you and also have the chance to hear back from you concerning the method to implement them.

Our challenge for the 1980s should focus on developing system safety efforts that are “more effective, meaningful and comprehensive”. Special attention should be given to a true appreciation of the benefits, costs, risk assessment, criticality, and priorities for accomplishment of safety tasks and objectives.

Performing the System Safety task in one element is NOT ENOUGH.

The Society must improve its ability to provide to the membership basic knowledge concerning new and improved techniques, technical and management information, and to implement progress being achieved in academic education and membership professional development.

The Society’s objectives should be to provide meaningful services to its members and its officers should provide dynamic leadership to cooperatively advance the professional interests of its members. Specifically the following goals during this period are offered:

• To develop positive System Safety Education and Training Programs. This involves encouraging academic training in system safety and continuing mini-symposia on specialized topics for cooperation and support of safety conferences.
• To support activities that will result in professional development.
• To improve cooperative relationships with other organizations and Societies (around the World) with common objectives to facilitate exchange of information.
• To expand the recognition of Safety professionals by annual awards such as Safety of the Year, Safety Scientist of the Year, Safety Educator of the Year, Safety Manager of the Year, etc.
• To formulate and develop System Safety consensus standards for definition of program requirement standards relating to product and system safety development.
• To actively encourage more professionals to join in Society membership and participate in Society activities.
• To coordinate with legislative actions involving System Safety.
• To communicate to System Safety professionals in all fields through chapter activities, mini-symposia, conferences, and international activity.
• To expand and improve our means of the exchange of ideas, concepts, information, methods by increasing size and frequency of publications such as Hazard Prevention, the Journal for the SSS, Chapter newsletters, Conference proceedings, and other written publications.
• To encourage more company and group affiliations for System Safety instruction of all engineers in undergraduate programs.
• To encourage more company and group affiliations for System Safety Society membership.
• To make the System Safety Society a recognized “international forum” for the exchange of information on product and system safety.

The accomplishment of these goals is dependent upon the cooperation and participation of the membership. Every effort will be made to create and increase the opportunity for active involvement of the membership at all levels. The strength of the Society rests in each one of us performing at some level of activity and actively accepting some responsibility as a professional toward improvement of himself and thereby increasing the stature of the Society.

[Editor Note (2022): Brian M. Moriarty was a Past President of ISSS as well as the co-author of the book System Safety Engineering and Management.]