Implications of STAMP for Warhead Safety at AWE

Malcolm Jones

doi:10.56094/jss.v56i3.14

Authors

Malcolm Jones

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v56i3.14

Keywords:

STAMP, nuclear

Abstract

STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is a relatively new approach to safety assessment methodology and post-accident cause analysis; its prime developer is Nancy Leveson of MIT. STAMP is a holistic system-level approach to overall organizational structure and to technical operations and design. It takes a comprehensive look at all possible organizational and technical system influences that can ultimately affect the safety of technical processes and product designs in whatever scenarios or environments in which they operate or to which they are subjected. Of course, the process can be applied equally to both reliability of performance and security, in addition to safety.

Author Biography

Malcolm Jones

Malcolm Jones has previously led the Distinguished Scientists group at AWE and currently holds the position of Scientific Adviser to AWE’s Chief Scientist, directly supporting AWE’s Chief of Product Assurance. His career at AWE has taken him through a wide range of scientific and engineering topics, but he has maintained a continuous association with nuclear weapon design and process safety and top-level nuclear safety standards. His interests extend to corporate safety cultures and the root cause reasons for failures. He is a Fellow of the International System Safety Society and is an adviser to a number of senior U.K. Ministry of Defence and AWE safety bodies. He has been awarded an MBE in the Queen’s Birthday Honours List for contributions to the UK defence industry and is a recipient of the John Challens’ Medal, which is AWE’s highest award for lifetime contributions to science, engineering and technology. He has also been honoured by VNIIA in the Russian Federation for his work in fostering nuclear weapon safety collaboration between the U.K and the RF.

References

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Suokas, J. "On the reliability and validity of safety analysis," Technical Report Publications 25, Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland, September, 1985.

Jones, M. "Safety Culture and High Consequence Accident/Failure Theories," International System Safety Conference (ISSC 22), 2004.

Jones, M. "Chasing the Black Swan," International System Safety Conference (ISSC36), 2018. https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i3.63 DOI: https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v54i3.63