Unintended Consequences: Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Terry Hardy

doi:10.56094/jss.v51i3.145

Authors

Terry Hardy Great Circle Analytics

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.56094/jss.v51i3.145

Keywords:

Diablo Canyon, accident, nuclear, lessons learned, environment

Abstract

On October 21, 2008, Reactor Unit 2 at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant in San Luis Obispo County, California was manually scrammed when operators detected inadequate flow of cooling water to the circulating water system. The power plant obtained cooling water from the Pacific Ocean. The water entered an intake structure by passing through bar racks, and then flowed through traveling screen assemblies. The bar racks and screens prevented debris and sea life from entering the circulating water pumps.

Author Biography

Terry Hardy, Great Circle Analytics

Terry Hardy leads efforts in system safety and software assurance at Great Circle Analytics. Mr. Hardy has over 25 years of experience and numerous publications in the areas of launch vehicles, space propulsion, cryogenics, software, safety analysis, and risk management. Prior to founding Great Circle Analytics, he led software safety and assurance efforts at Special Aerospace Services and at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; responsibilities included membership on the Constellation Safety Engineering Review Panel. Mr. Hardy also was the Principal Engineer for Reliability in FAA's Office of Commercial Space Transportation, leading efforts to develop safety, reliability, and risk management regulations, guidance documents, and training. Mr. Hardy holds a BS degree in chemical engineering, an MS degree in chemical engineering, and an MS degree in civil engineering. He also has been certified as a Reliability Engineer, Quality Engineer, and Software Quality Engineer through the American Society for Quality.