Exxon Valdez: Human Error, Plain and Simple

Authors

  • Arthur Barondes AIC

Keywords:

Exxon Valdez, human error, oil spill, human failure

Abstract

Much has been made of the Exxon Valdez going aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound in 1989 — and rightfully so. The effects of the disaster continue to this day. Why the Exxon Valdez went aground is straightforward, although not widely well understood. As can be expected, various interests seized upon the catastrophe to support their causes or improve their lots. Whereas it is now clear that the ship went aground purely as a consequence of human errors — there were no mechanical or electrical failures — the event has been used to justify changes that, while desirable, would not have prevented the Exxon Valdez from going aground, or the subsequent oil spill. Those changes include, inter alia, a variety of improved navigational aids, expanded Coast Guard monitoring capabilities, increased requirements for harbor pilots and required crew rest. In looking back, one might be led to believe that the ship went aground in a sea of red herrings. This article reviews what really happened on that night and incontrovertible evidence that supports human errors — onboard the Exxon Valdez and thousands of miles away at the Exxon Shipping Company — in a failed safety culture as solely responsible for the disaster.

Author Biography

Arthur Barondes, AIC

Arthur Barondes, a principal at AIC, has developed, conducted and peer-reviewed probabilistic QRAs for 22 years. He worked on the “DoD/DOE Transportation Safety Study,” developed the Weapon System Safety Assessment (WSSA) methodology for nuclear weapon systems, and led the peer-review teams for subsequent WSSAs and for the DDESB-requested SAFER program review. Earlier experience includes 11 years supporting the Defense Nuclear Agency “Theater Nuclear Forces Improvement Program” in Europe and 27 years in the Air Force, including command of a Minuteman III ICBM wing, and experimental flight test of Air Force and Navy air-to-air missile systems. He is a rated Master Navigator with 4,500 flying hours. He has a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an MS(Aero) from the University of Michigan, an MBA from George Washington University and did his doctoral work at American University. He is a distinguished graduate of the National War College.

References

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Marine Accident Report: Grounding of the U.S. Tankship Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound near Valdez, Alaska March 24, 1989, PB90-916405, NTSB/MAR-90/04, Washington, DC:, Office of Surface Transportation Safety, 1990.

http://www.solarnavigator.net/boats/exxon_valdez.htm

Ibid.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Palast#Exxon_Valdez

http://www.gregpalast.com/court-rewards-exxon-for-valdez-oil-spill/

Hq USCG, The Coast Guard’s Role in the EXXON VALDEZ Incident, Historian Office, Washington, DC http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/EV.pdf

http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080109150820AAyLbG3

NTSB, op. cit.

Levinson, N.G., A New Approach to System Safety Engineering, MIT, August 2006.

NTSB, op. cit., p. 163.

USCG, op. cit., Appendix J, “Speech Examination Information,” pp. 219-255.

Ibid., p. 54.

Grove, C., “BLIGH REEF: Lack of crew communication about boat position, course is cited,” Anchorage Daily News, May 10, 2011. http://www.adn.com/2011/05/10/1855776/report-faults-captain-in-tugboat.html

Exxon Valdez: Human Error, Plain and Simple

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Published

2014-06-01

How to Cite

Barondes, A. (2014). Exxon Valdez: Human Error, Plain and Simple. Journal of System Safety, 50(2), 22–30. Retrieved from https://jsystemsafety.com/index.php/jss/article/view/227